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Abstract: The aim of this editorial is to explore, conceptualize, and research the need to internalize
both animals and ecosystems in our understanding of social citizenship and social policy. This edi-
torial should be seen as a brief overview of the themes that should be covered in the contributions
to the Special Issue, “Internalizing Animals and Ecosystems in Social Citizenship and Social Pol-
icy: From Political Community to Political Country”. This Special Issue argues the importance
of integrating animals and ecosystems as a way to re-politicize humans’ social relation with both
animals and our ecosystem as in sustainable development and social policy. If environmental policy
becomes social policy, we would re-construct social citizenship to include consideration for animals
and ecosystems as integral part of social policy. This expansion in scope is a progression from
seeing humans as part of a political community to becoming more involved in their political country.
This aligns with the concept of Country—an all-encompassing term in Australia, involving a people’s
territory, land, water, biological resources, the complex obligations and relationships involved.
Keywords: social policy; social citizenship; animal welfare; conservation; wellbeing; sustainability;
preservation; ecosystem services; environmental ethics; political theory
1. Bringing Nature into Social Policy
Nature is a complex and much disputed term. However, it is clear that the way we
think about the world, and our place in it, has a powerful influence on the policies we
implement. This is particularly the case with environmental and sustainability policies,
which reflect our conceptualization of nature and our relationships to it. In this editorial we
ask whether it is necessary to fundamentally re-conceptualize social policy and citizenship.
The aim of this Special Issue is to explore, conceptualize, and research the need to inter-
nalize both animals and ecosystems in our understanding of social citizenship, social policy,
and sustainable development; to rethink the nexus of social policy and the environment by
bridging the strands of deep ecology, environmental justice, and citizenship/animal rights
literature; and to integrate social policy with climate justice, international development,
and environmental protection/conservation. This Special Issue argues that we need to
integrate animals and ecosystems in humans’ social relation.
Our starting point and endpoint is that both humans and animals share the same
social world and, therefore, we need to rethink “the social” in ways that re-integrate the
human and natural world. The purpose is very specific: to think through how social policy
and environmental policy can become united.
If environmental policy becomes social policy, we would re-construct social citizen-
ship to include consideration for animals and ecosystems as integral part of social policy.
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This expansion in scope is a progression from seeing humans as part of a political commu-
nity to becoming more involved in their political country. The concept of country is an
all-encompassing term in Australia, involving a people’s territory, land, water, biological
resources, the complex obligations and relationships involved [1].
This editorial aims to broadly scope the issues, setting the scene for the different
contributions to further our understanding of the roles of animals and ecosystems in social
citizenship. We take the reader on a brief journey through relevant discussions around
the ideas that social policy is environmental policy and that human wellbeing cannot be
divorced from ecological wellbeing.
2. Is Social Policy Environmental Policy?
To explore these issues, this paper examines how humans attempt to define themselves
as separate from other species, delineating our social space from the environment and
the ecology. We are probably the only species that reflects upon ourselves as something
separate, or divorced from nature. The words “society” and “social” define our human
social spaces as something inherently different from the world of animals. When we reflect
upon ourselves mainly through texts, words and symbols we also engage in an alienation
process, as no other animal or ecosystem can engage in written communication with us.
In much of our writings and intellectual endeavors we tend to forget that our human life
is far from a purely intellectual, disembodied experience but rather a joined-up physical,
practical, relational, and connected existence, embedded within, dependent on, and a part
of nature.
What is the difference between humans and animals? This question starts our ques-
tioning of how humans define our relationship with our environment and what it should
be—a utilitarian resource, relational, spiritual or something else? By defining ourselves as
sometimes connected to and sometimes separate from animals and the ecosystem, we hu-
mans create parallel social spaces where animals do not possess the essential qualities to be
active in our social, civil, and political communities.
However, if we see humans, animals, and ecosystems together as part of the social
sphere, there is no justification for social and environmental policy to be separated, now or
in the future. The next section briefly explores our relationship to nature and how concepts
of utilitarian and intrinsic values impact our social understanding of our surroundings
and ourselves.
3. Preserving, Conserving, and Wise Use of the Environment
The planet’s diverse human cultures have many rich and intimate ways of defining
their relationships with animals, non-human others, and their environments [2]. However,
in this article we concentrate on the kinds of ideas that typify contemporary, Western
environmental thinking and contemporary social policy approaches and its two dominant
ways of conceptualizing animals and ecosystems—the “preservationist” and “wise use”
schools of thought. These conceptualizations provoke very different responses to how
we should regulate our shared social spaces with animals. One seeks to preserve nature,
often defined as “wilderness” in a pristine state without human interference. The other
argues for the use of the environment in ways that sustain natural resources for future
generations [3].
The first mode—preservationist—sets up wilderness and nature as pure and pristine,
uncontaminated by human involvement. It is as if modern humans cannot have any
meaningful and sincere two-way relationship with nature and need to be kept apart from
nature to protect it. This pure, wild form of nature is defined as a spiritual retreat, such that
humans can only be temporary visitors in this wonderland of wilderness. Visiting this
nature provides refuge from an ever-expanding human civilization, and its industrial
“bads” of crowding, pollution, and exploitation.
The second approach—wise use—emphasizes the utilitarian values of nature, but lim-
its enchantment. Nature is defined as a reserve of natural resources where human choices –
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in policy and practice – either deplete or conserve these resources for coming generations,
often expressed as half-hearted, inter-generational concern. These two conceptualisations
are characterized by social movements that campaign either for “wilderness” preservation
or the “wise use” of natural resources.
The concepts of preservation and conservation have evolved with changing views
about humans, nonhuman nature, and the intersections between social and ecological
systems [4]. Conservation is therefore largely a normative endeavor [5]. Many conserva-
tionists ground their mission in ideas that nonhuman nature is valuable, for its own sake,
and ought to be preserved, frequently referring to the concept of “intrinsic value” (IV)
(e.g., [6,7]). The term intrinsic value signifies recognition of the fundamental goodness of
the world (e.g., [8–10]).
The rise of the preservation ethic triggered a backlash against using IV of nature
to motivate conservation (Compare [11,12]), with some conservationists rejecting the
philosophical principles underpinning IV [13]. They seek more pragmatic and practice-
oriented discourses based in what works in conservation policies and programs that
actively involve people [14]. These more anthropocentric approaches focus on the human
benefits of conserving and carefully managing natural systems [15] and on developing
polices, programs, and practices that constructively involve people in the care of ecosystems
and natural resources [14].
These more utilitarian approaches differ from the IV school of thought in that they
align protecting the environment with human uses and benefits. The direct and indirect
benefits humans derive from ecosystems are often referred to as ecosystem goods and
services. Critics argue that the widespread use of market metaphors to define nature’s
value is leading to the extreme financialization of nature [16].
The IV and utilitarian approaches rely on fundamentally different underlying logics
about whether the environment is valuable in its own right, or only when assigned to
meeting human needs. However, both types rely to a degree on externalizing or projecting
ideas about the environment’s value. This leads to important questions about how we can
value nature without also making our own values and preferences part of the equation.
When we deliberate the extrinsic and intrinsic value of nature, we are indirectly
deliberating whether humans and their cultures, institutions, and ways of comprehending
the world have an extrinsic or intrinsic value. In taking the position as an external assessor,
and arbiter, of the value of nature, we must alienate ourselves from nature. This is a “noble
lie” because we share the same material destiny of all living things on Earth, and therefore
cannot be separated from it.
4. Internalizing Animals and Ecosystems into a Human Capitalist Order
After the birth of agriculture, re-shaping nature to create value for humans became
humans’ predominant activity. This endeavor intensified greatly with the industrial rev-
olution and its great acceleration in the 20th century [17]. Humans add value to nature,
as something manipulated to become products or property, using complex culturally deter-
mined property rights and valuation processes. This economic turn does not just result
in the commodification of nature in the abstract, but also brings animals and ecosystems
into the human capitalist order. This internalization has profound implications for our
relationships with nature, at personal, political, and global scales. With the popularization
of the concept of the Anthropocene we are now involved in contemplating managing the
entire Earth as a system subject to human control and governance [18]. This expands the
scope and the scale of the nature we aim to govern, stretches institutions that evolved in
the era of nation states, and intensifies our custodial responsibilities. Climate change and
other threats to planetary boundaries are becoming iconic concerns about our changing
relationships to the Earth [17].
The neoclassical explanation of climate change is that emissions exist in the economy
as externalities that are not reflected in the exchange of goods on the market. “To deal with
such externalities, new methods of environmental valuation and market-based solutions to
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protect the environment have been introduced across the world” [19]. This marketization of
environmental regulations is not a new phenomenon. First proposed in the 1960s, pollution
trading was developed by American economists and derivatives traders in the 1970s and
1980s and underwent a series of failed policy experiments before becoming the centerpiece
of the USA Acid Rain Program in the 1990s, when deregulatory fervor was supported by
the Clinton administration [20].
The reliance on markets to deliver utilitarian conservation outcomes reflects the
dominance of the wise use movement’s ideals of shepherding resources through markets to
serve markets. Accompanied by a championing of neo-liberal reforms many governments
became champions of markets as both ends in themselves and as governing mechanisms for
regulating society and its resource use. This combination of ideas about ecosystem services,
enlightened anthropocentrism, and neo-liberal marketization focuses on the utilitarian
use of ecosystems through the lens of human valuation, resulting in an outcompeting
and undermining of ideas about intrinsic value of ecosystems (e.g., [21]). The infatuation
with marketized approaches also undermined other types of policy responses, such as
traditional regulation. With this increasing financialization of nature, ideas about the
intrinsic value of nature appear quaint, flawed, or old fashioned [16].
The ideal of intrinsic value is increasingly being supplanted by approaches that em-
phasize nature’s instrumental value for humans. Defining these “ecosystem services”
brings nature into the neo-liberal capitalist order as another financial product [16]. The con-
sequence is that nature and its service need to be priced and emissions/environmental
degradations are represented as direct costs. Many influential studies frame environmental
problems in these market terms. These include the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiver-
sity (TEEB) and its publication, “Mainstreaming the Economics of Nature” [22] and the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) report, “Towards a Green Economy” [23].
The main argument is that nature provides environmental goods and services for free,
such as clean air, water, soil, and access to food, minerals, and energy. Without monetary
values attached to these goods and services, their value is not recognized, understated or
non-existent. Environmental destruction and degradation, such as air pollution, water pol-
lution, soil contamination, climate change, natural resource depletion, and biodiversity
loss have a “zero” price tag, leading to negative trade-offs and to a relationship of (self-) de-
structiveness that people have towards nature [22]. Such devaluing of nature has changed
in recent years, with ecosystem services, nature conservation, and even carbon emissions
included in economic policy considerations [24].
Many prominent economists argue that the environment in general, and carbon
emissions in particular, should be understood in market terms, with prices attached to
carbon emissions and environmental goods and services [25]. The main idea is that people,
governments, and firms only value the environment if monetary values or prices attach
to it. Ecosystem services were popularized within ecological economics by thinkers such
as Robert Costanza and colleagues [26], spawning many thousands of ecosystem service
valuation studies [27]. Yet, while the claimed policy impact of ecosystem service valuations
is highly dubious [28]), the intellectual framework shifted to focus on improving valuations,
rather than on changing practices and resource use through other policy instruments,
like regulation.
Further, these monetary, calculative rationalities diminish the sense of reverence
or custodial responsibilities that have characterized many cultures relationships with
their environments [2]. Such reverential and custodial relationships may offer important
pathways to enriching relationships with nature, but have often been dismissed as quaint
and old-fashioned, in a world in which nature can be securitized and traded as a new
frontier of the financial markets [16].
5. Opening up Social Policy for the Environment
With this financialization of nature and its many services we arrive at a new kind
of world. In this new world, the social sphere is not shared by humans, animals, and
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ecosystems, but rather has become a global marketplace where animals, ecosystems, and
their services are commodities to be harvested, sold, invested, saved, and consumed [16].
This marketization appears to be an extremist position, but in contemporary political
discourse it is becoming the middle ground. Extremists on the market side argue that
any restrictions on production, pollution, and consumption are unnecessary red tape that
impedes human welfare and economic growth. Oreskes and Conway [29] convincingly
argue that these pro-market positions’ demonize regulation and red tape, successfully char-
acterizing climate change policies as the greatest threat to free enterprise. Environmental
protection policies and the science informing those policies were vigorously challenged
because “if you believed in capitalism, you had to attack science, because science had
revealed the hazards that capitalism had brought in its wake” [29] (p. 167). Treating climate
science as “ambivalent” or containing the “possibility for reasonable doubt” opened up the
space for this counter-narrative, which claims mainstream climate science involves a “leap
of interpretative faith” [30] (p. 64).
Latour describes this position as “out-of-this-world,” because one is required to ig-
nore the realities of life on Earth. It is post-political in the most literal sense of the term:
“a politics with no object,” since it rejects the world that it claims to inhabit [31] (p. 38). La-
tour contrasts this with a “terrestrial” position, which acknowledges our deep dependence
on the environment. His voice is one of a growing chorus of critical voices revaluating
humans’ position vis-à-vis the wellbeing and welfare of animals and ecosystems.
Environmental problems such as climate change can be understood as a result of
“human chauvinism” of “anthropocentrism” [32,33]. Acknowledgement of nonhuman
entities, and our interdependence on them, and the planetary systems of life, indicate the
pressing need to develop reverence, respect and care for non-human others as part of our
personal and cultural responses to the environmental crisis.
This interdependent position opposes notions that humans and nature are separate.
As Eckersley highlights, eco-centrism “emphasize[s] the importance of a general change
in consciousness and suggest[s] that a gradual cultural, educational and social revolution
involving a reorientation of our sense of place in the evolutionary drama is likely to
provide a better long-term protection of the interests of the non-human world” [34] (p. 59).
Recognizing this interdependence challenges the fairy tale of eternal, limitless growth
and deeply problematizes the capitalist narratives. It leads to different conclusions, such
as the need for more regulation, a greater commitment to constraining and intervening
in markets, and closer governance our ways of living. The eco-centric narrative accepts
humans as one species among others, an integral part of nature [35] collectively inhabiting
a single planet—the Earth [18].
The outline above reveals that social policy, as a social practice cannot reconcile a
libertarian anthropocentrism and academic ecocentrism. These dilemmas are reflected in
struggles to reconcile protection of human welfare, animal welfare, and environmental
welfare. Recourse to utilitarianism is unlikely to resolve these persistent dilemmas.
The nexus between social policy and the environment has grown in importance since
the end of the 1980s, attracting discussion on the greening of social policy [36] and the
balance between ecological and social rationality [37]. A strong rationale exists, therefore,
for addressing environmental issues in social policy [38–40], often by linking sustainability,
low carbon development, and climate change mitigation with social policy [38,40–43]. Oth-
ers suggest that we need to think about the goals of social policy and welfare increasingly
in terms of sustainable wellbeing, rather than growth-driven economic wellbeing [44].
This includes a shift away from individual questions of wellbeing focused on income, work,
health, and education that are connected with growth-driven logics of welfare. Instead,
we need to use sustainable and resilient wellbeing concepts that enable us to resist and
survive shocks caused by a warming climate, and which reconcile human development
with ecological constraints [44].
Social policy should aim to protect both humans and the environment; however, this
requires reducing wasteful over-consumption of natural resources, polluting technologies,
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and engaging with the highly divisive topic of population control. It requires social policy
based in an ecological rather than a human-centered perspective. This is a challenge for
dominant social policies that are focused on protecting the living standards of most citizens
from the volatile market. Only rarely do these policies focus on protecting the environ-
ment from the over-consuming living standards of developed countries. For example,
the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and the sustainable development discourse
link social policy and international development in a joint aspiration to generate growth
and sustainability concurrently, with limited attention to the inherent contradictions be-
tween growth-driven development and environmental protection. “While social policies in
terms of welfare institutions have a long history in developed countries, they have been
deeply embedded and reliant upon a society marked by productivism, overconsumption,
and economic growth. . . These are all objectives that most variants of green thinking op-
pose” [45]. Low-carbon development implies sharing costs equitably, across communities
and nations. Therefore, social policy becomes increasingly important in sharing the burden.
Whether the SDGs and adjacent policy interventions are radical enough to realize the goals
of human welfare, and animal and environmental welfare, remain doubtful. As Mead-
owcroft observes, “the welfare state has always been seen as a complement to a growing
economy” [46] (p. 8).
Ecological modernization implies a strong state that would drive ecological devel-
opment. It is based on two major assumptions: low carbon technology would drive
development and states would invest in it to boost their own competitiveness. These ideals
are shared by green Keynesian scholars, who merge social democratic economics and
welfare states, with low-carbon development and notions of a capitalist green economy.
The idea of an “ecological state” that could replace the welfare state shares many parallels
with this mode of thinking [46]. Yet, the modern welfare state has deep limitations in its
capacity for developing ecologically grounded policy. The ecological state shares similar
humanitarian concerns as the welfare state, with concerns about regulating social life and
addressing market and voluntary failures, and altering existing economic interactions [46].
The normative foundations of ecological modernization are largely the same as those that
informed the foundations of the modern welfare state, offering limited space for rethinking
the role and purpose of social policy from an ecological perspective.
Some green Keynesian approaches argue for a global carbon tax instead of a reliance on
carbon trading. This tax could be linked to direct regulations and more active and progres-
sive redistribution through global transfers to developing countries [47]. These approaches
advocate regulating markets, assuming that nation states, at national and international
levels, will coax the markets and firms to invest in low carbon development [48]. Generally,
there is a preference to finance this development through global carbon taxes and/or Tobin
style taxes on “short term, cross-border foreign exchange transactions” [49]. It could also be
financed through payments of developed industrial countries’ carbon debts to developing
countries [47].
However, higher green taxes or high carbon taxes can be regressive since lower
income households tend to spend a higher share of their income on energy, the costs will
be disproportionately high for people with lower incomes. This is amplified by the fact
that many people with lower incomes tend to live in energy inefficient houses, with higher
energy costs. Hills [50] argues that carbon taxation requires complementary social policies,
investing in low-emission housing, transport, communities while also protecting low-
income citizens who have high carbon consumption. Scholars outside the traditional
social policy discourse propose more actively curbing humans resource use vis-à-vis the
environment. Some of these are explored below.
6. Progressive Alternatives to Business-as-Usual Social Policy
One of the most debated alternatives—the “steady state economy”—comes from
Herman Daly, who proposes a policy framework for reducing humans’ ecological footprint
by limiting consumption [51]. This work raises difficult questions about restricting resource
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use, individual “freedoms” and living standards. Daly pointed out in the 1970s that growth
economies based relied on “externalisation of environmental costs in growth accounting”
and “the systematic underpricing of natural resources to the societal dominance of the
other production factors such as capital and labour” [52].
Daly argues economists focus too much on the economy’s circulatory system and
less on its digestive tract—the economy’s consumption of resources and generation of
waste. Growth of throughput means more resources pushed through an overgrowing
digestive tract. Extending the digestive metaphor, the author [51] (p. 1) suggests the
economy should be transformed from gourmands to gourmets, focusing more on quality
rather than quantity of consumption. He argues for an “economy with constant population
and constant stock of capital, maintained by a low rate of throughput that is within the
regenerative and assimilative capacities of the ecosystem” [51] (p. 3). Three key policy
tools are needed to transform societies towards a steady state economy: minimum and
maximum limits on income and wealth, improving the tax system, and setting restrictions
on population growth.
The de-growth discourse argues that economic growth is impossible to sustain. It ques-
tions whether it is possible to decouple economic activity and global emissions. In the
famous book, “The Limits to Growth” by Meadows et al. [53], they argue that exponential
growth in population and material output threatens the wellbeing of all and could lead to
an uncontrolled global decline [53]. More recently, Tim Jackson [54] argued for “prosperity
without growth” or prosperity within the ecological limits of our finite planet. Still the
concept of growth and consumption is ingrained in public policy. “Someone once said
that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism” [55]
(p. 76). De-growth approaches that focus on wellbeing and quality of life decouple these
from a growing gross domestic product (GDP) or increased economic activity. This implies
new macroeconomic approaches, which might mean, for example, a reduction in working
hours [56].
However, the state would need to ensure that economic resources are more evenly
distributed so that the poor would not be disproportionally affected. This redistribution
also implies sharing the wealth of nations more equally. Scholars such as Lohman [57],
Galbraith [58] and Speth [59] argue not only for higher global carbon taxes and higher
investment in low carbon development, specifically low carbon energy and low carbon
technology, but they suggest the need to replace reliance on the markets with “alternative
democratic co-ordination and decision-making mechanisms” [60] (1026). These ideas imply
that low carbon societies could only be sustained by low-growth, no-growth, or—in the case
of Western developed countries—even de-growth strategies, executed using all available
policy instruments. Scholars such as Speth [59] argue that we are currently on a trajectory
towards either a collapse of the capitalist system or a collapse of our global climate.
One alternative scenario for global governance is that natural resources are collec-
tively owned and co-operatively managed, with the use of natural resources subject to
decentralized democratic decision-making. For this, people and governments need to be
willing to accept lower consumption, lower growth, more distribution of resources, and
higher social equality that result in “improved welfare, a better quality of life and greater
democratic control of production and (renewable) resources” [60] (p. 1026).
Environmental socialism sees the environmental crisis as directly linked and caused
by the crisis of industrial capitalism, arguing environmental issues cannot be solved
unless there are radical restructurings of the international system [61]. This would need
a complete reconfiguration of our understanding of welfare states, global social and the
global market. Still, none of these socio-political perspectives force us to account for
animals and ecosystems as integral parts of a shared social space.
7. Animating Welfare
To integrate animals and ecosystems into our social and political community we need
to rethink our understanding of what community is and means. Animal communities
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work according to other principles, with species hunting, killing, and eating each other.
Our ecosystems are not based on lions deliberating on whether to eat gazelles (or any other
animals for that matter). If they did, a question would rapidly rise about how to keep a
balance between species. Humans are top predators and animals but also custodians of the
Earth. This custodial perspective sees overall wellbeing as the priority, meaning that the
ecosystem as a whole should thrive, which may involve the culling of particular species or
even hunting for food in a responsible way. This way of thinking clashes with the view
that each individual animal is a rights-holder on equal terms with human beings.
If we are all citizens with individual rights then it is paradoxical for us humans to
eat our fellow animal citizens. The wellbeing of ecosystems and animals are in this sense
irreconcilable, leading to an inevitable clash between granting rights to ecosystem or
granting rights to all sentient individual life. Bentham’s [62] famous “Can they suffer?”
quote asks whether animals share our emotions and our affective experiences. Caring
for animals is situated in what an animal feels. Ross and Mason [63] (p. 46) see the
outcome of animal welfare as ”measurable, positive influences on animals’ affective states.”
Duncan [64] suggests this is a purely hedonistic approach claiming that animal welfare
should be understood through subjective feelings such as negative feelings and suffering
on one side and positive feelings and pleasure on the other side. Animal rights arguments
move away from ecosystem perspectives, focusing on individual animal’s pains and
pleasures and how to minimize the first and maximize the second. Animal rights scholars
tend to start from a utilitarian perspective focusing on animals’ ability to feel things, which
makes them similar to human beings. Broom [65] argues that poor functioning is a welfare
concern independent of an animal’s affective state. Ross and Mason [63] suggest that
some access to natural stimuli may be associated with “positive affective responses to
stimuli that signaled safety and resources to our evolutionary ancestors”, while Bracke and
Hopster [66] highlight natural animal behaviors that are core to animal welfare “because
these behaviors are pleasurable and because they promote biological functioning.” Fraser
highlights that living natural lives is welfare-enhancing and valuable in itself [67] (p. 76).
Fraser et al. [68] argues that animal welfare should be based around conditions that allow
animals to feel well, function well, and to express species-specific behaviors-
Most animal welfare discussions leave out the rest of the nature with no “concern for
the welfare of plants, protozoa, or the lower invertebrates” [64]. This idea challenges us to
expand our understanding of welfare beyond higher animals and to start thinking about
the wellbeing of forests, lakes and rivers or other large ecosystems—like mountain ranges,
oceans estuaries-and their inhabitants [69]. At these scales there is frequent references to
environmental health. The question is whether, or how, we can reconcile these ideas about
health and wellbeing from individuals to systems. There is a growing literature separating
welfare/wellbeing issues from sentience, as evidenced in the fish welfare literature [70,71].
This steps away from what animals feel. Lassen et al. [72] found that citizens’ concerns
include not only minimizing suffering but also defining what “physical harm” and “a
natural life” involve.
It brings us to the question of what a good life is for anything living. For this, we hu-
manize the subjects of nature, adding concepts such as preference, which often imply how
essential different environments or resources are to animals [73]. The discussion of what
a good animal life should be includes the ability to perform natural behaviors and the
features deemed essential for an animal to have good welfare [74].
There is an inherent conflict between looking at wellbeing in terms of how well the
overall ecosystem works, or how individual species/animals feel, behave or function.
This dichotomy translates into two fundamental paths in integrating nature/animals
into our social sphere. We discuss these in the next section, looking at the wellbeing of
individual humans and humans as a species.
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8. Expanding the Scope of Social Policy
Integrating animals and nature into an overall framework results in conflicts between
the functioning of overall ecosystems and the wellbeing of individual animals. We exem-
plify this chasm, taking up two approaches that attempt to breach the social boundaries
between nature and humans.
The first approach attempts to include animals into our human community as mem-
bers. Efforts to expand our political understanding of community to include non-human
others, such as animals, include Donaldson and Kymlicka’s “Zoopolis: A Political The-
ory of Animal Rights” [75]. They advocate beyond animal rights for animal citizenship,
arguing that the interests of animals should be seen as essential to what we perceive as the
common good. Donaldson and Kymlicka’s [75] develop a rather advanced and nuanced
understanding of inclusive citizenship that recognizes multiple communities with animal
members, and with varying human obligations toward them.
Other scholars, such as O’Sullivan in “Animals, Equality, and Democracy” [76] high-
light the need to include animals in a community based around liberal values and species
egalitarianism. The authors propose uniform and egalitarian standards for animal treat-
ment of the highest standards. Cochrane on the other hand argues for a more constrained
equality where animal rights are based upon interests. “Rights possession simply means
that their holders have certain important, basic interests that impose duties on others” [77]
(p. 2).
These liberal perspectives give rights to animals as if they are humans, calling for
consideration of the suffering of animals as if they live human lives. They propose that
animals should live fulfilling lives without pain. However, ecosystems do not operate
on the principles of the wellbeing of individuals and species. When a lion attacks a
gazelle, it creates suffering in the individual animal, but it is vital for the overall ecosystem.
Removal of apex predators alters the whole ecosystem.
The second approach expands the principles of justice to our environment and ecosys-
tems. The environmental justice discourse focuses on the functioning of communities and
ecosystems, instead of looking at individual suffering. Environmental justice originated in
the USA, bringing attention to how race and ethnicity are intertwined with the distributions
of environmental “bads”, like pollution and technological risk [78] (p. 9). It underpins the
political activism to “resist the imposition of toxic and polluting facilities in minority and
poor communities” [79] (p. 356).
The focus of environmental justice often includes participation, recognition, and capabili-
ties. Pulido [80], Faber [81], and Schlosberg [82] highlight the importance of process and
production in environmental justice. Schlosberg and Carruthers [83] argue that indigenous
demands for environmental justice are not just about distributional equity but also about
the functioning of indigenous communities, and their traditions and practices that can
protect the essential relationship between indigenous people and their ancestral lands.
The capability/functioning approach expands the scope from individuals towards the
functioning and capabilities of communities and their environment [83].
Schlosberg argues that adding a capability dimension to environmental justice en-
riches “conceptions of environmental and climate justice by bringing recognition to the
functioning of these systems, in addition to those who live within and depend on them” [84]
(p. 44). Taking environmental justice beyond its human-centric discourse, scholars such as
Hillman [85] explore the importance of ecological integrity and the potential for self-repair
and independent management of ecosystems [86].
Indigenous perspectives often recognize humans as inseparable from other living
things, seeing the environment as an interconnected community (Compare [87,88]). This is
important for social policy’s scope, requiring wider environmental concerns to be included
in processes normally perceived as anthropocentric [89]. “When we interrupt, corrupt, or
defile the potential functioning of ecological support systems, we do an injustice not only
to human beings, but also to all of those non-humans that depend on the integrity of the
system for their own functioning” [84] (p. 44). This perspective includes ideas about the
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functioning and capabilities individuals, communities, and the environment that forms the
land of the communities.
Westra [90] links environmental justice with biological/ecological integrity high-
lighting the interdependence between functioning of indigenous communities and the
functioning of the environment. “If the rights of indigenous peoples are based, first, on
their rights to biological integrity and natural function; and second, these rights cannot
be separated from the protection of the ecological integrity of their lands; then third, en-
trenching such rights would limit the freedom of Western industrial operations to commit
crimes” [90] (p. 19). Environmental justice needs therefore to protect indigenous auton-
omy and the functioning of communities with the biological integrity of ancestral land to
prevent “biological genocide” [90].
This thinking goes beyond the wellbeing of individual animals/species and look at
the overall environmental community with humans as a part.
9. Environmental Social Rights and Welfare: Rethinking Social Policy as
Environmental Policy
The existing interventions in social policy—both in the academic study and in the
practices of governments—tend to have three things in common. First, social policy is in
its very essence anthropocentric, concerned with human needs and wellbeing. Second,
and largely as a result of this, ecological perspectives in social policy are generally a
residual category: even when social policies respond to ecological questions, the policy
consequences are understood through their impact on human needs and wellbeing (e.g.,
options for addressing the social inequalities arising from stricter environmental policies).
Thirdly, policy solutions are largely focused on limiting and regulating human behavior.
The nature of the policy problem is therefore fundamentally different from that which
informed the foundations of the original welfare state. We have moved from a problem
of addressing “wants” that could be resolved by redistribution and provision of greater
resources to a problem of imposing “limits”.
Welfare systems are, arguably, failing humanity when we compare their impact against
the magnitude of the changes required to address the challenges of climate change. To re-
spond to these challenges in a realistic way, and for welfare systems to play a central role
in supporting both human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in social policy
thinking needs to be more revolutionary than the original conception of the welfare state
might have seemed in the late 19th century.
As government interventions the world over demonstrate, the key welfare policy chal-
lenge is to actually bring the target of the policy—the environment and the ecosystem—into
focus. New policies must impose limits, regulate, and curb human behavior effectively
and meaningfully. This innovation seems unlikely without new ideas, which equip us to
think about the nature of the ecological challenges we face, and the policies we require.
Donna Haraway emphatically articulates this need in her seminal work on developing
a multispecies perspective when she argues that “it matters what ideas we use to think
other ideas with [. . . ] it matters what thoughts think thoughts. It matters what knowledges
know knowledges” [91] (p. 34–35). The ideas, thoughts and knowledges matter because
they frame what is thinkable. So, what might social policy look like if it took ecological
perspectives seriously, replacing predominantly humanitarian questions with ecological
ones and moved ecosystems to the center of our understanding of the social?
One way to approach this thinking challenge is to take the central concepts of the
welfare state, and then “flip” them, shifting our focus from a humanitarian to an ecological
perspective. William Beveridge’s “five giants” of “want”, “disease”, “ignorance”, “squalor”,
and “idleness” formed the key pillars of the Beveridge Report and the modern British
welfare state [92]. Slaying these giants roughly translated to the welfare programs of social
security, the National Health Service, free education, social housing and employment.
These programs, embedded in governance regimes, illustrate the fundamental sticking
points in thinking of social policy as environmental policy. Beveridge’s metaphorical
giants are best described as the “giants of too little”, as opposed to the “giants of excess”
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that define most of our contemporary welfare challenges [93] (p. 844). The solution to a
policy problem defined by a lack of something is relatively simple: it can be resolved by
providing more (although negotiating the necessary redistributive arrangements can be
tricky). Dealing with problems of too much, however, are far more challenging, because
policy solutions involve imposing limits and curbing human behavior.
More specifically, what might Beveridge’s giants look like if viewed from an ecological
vantage point? With social policy flipped the social becomes the residual category of
environmental policy, and the consequences of social policy need to be understood in
terms of its impact on nature (i.e., how do we deal with the environmental impact of
progressive social policies?) Seeing “want” from an ecological perspective requires us to re-
conceptualize poverty. Rather than resolving the want of humans through social insurance
and associated measures, can we instead conceptualize the central problem as ecological
want: as the poverty of nature resulting from its relationship with humanity. Similarly,
seeing “disease” from an ecological standpoint forces us think beyond an approach centered
on a national health service and instead focus on ecological health. Health as a policy
problem goes beyond the negative impact of ecosystem alteration to human health [94]
to include an understanding of the positive impact of conservation and biodiversity on
human health [95], while also considering the health of nature and ecosystems as concerns
of equal merit to human health. Could the development of a multispecies perspective be
thinkable, where sick forests and sick animals are part of our community, and where health
policy might be driven by a common aspiration to realize species-specific behaviors as fully
as possible [68].
What these two short examples show, is that by reconceptualizing the “giants” from
an ecological perspective, the central policy problem—the problem of too much, of excess—
morphs into a problem of disequilibrium within a multispecies context. By locating ecosys-
tems at the center of our thinking about welfare, we begin the process of reconceptualizing
the policy problem. We are no longer seeing it simply as a case of imposing restrictions
and regulations on society, in isolation from nature, but perceiving of society and nature as
a single multi-species community. This presents policy tensions and challenges in terms
of realizing a multispecies conception of rights, for example. But these are tensions and
challenges of different order: we are beginning to shake up the ideas that we use to think
other ideas with.
10. Conclusions
The above exploration of modern social and environmental policy leads to some stark
conclusions. We should not forget there are similar logics for social and environmental
policy. These lie in providing for shared needs and interests and in regulating the excesses
and exploitation of capitalism.
Capitalism and its commodification processes have profound and severe environ-
mental and social implications. The more destructive aspects of capitalism were seen in
the 19th century when much of the western world’s population became dependent on
the industrialized markets for the survival. Karl Polanyi discusses labor as a “fictitious
commodity” since it is not produced for sale and it cannot be detached from the rest of a
human’s life [96] (p. 72). Polanyi also points out the importance of adding environment
to the analysis. He argues that land is also a fictitious commodity. Land is considered by
Polanyi as “another name for nature, which is not produced by man” [96] (p. 72).
He argues that the commodification of land, natural resources, the oceans, among
others, will generate collective “bads” that need collective responses from society. Polanyi
argues for a more active role of the state in regulating the land and protecting natural
resources from market forces: “[T]he commodity fiction disregarded the fact that leaving
the fate of soil and people to the market would be tantamount to annihilating them” [96]
(p. 73). If labor and land are fictitious commodities how can we prevent these from over
exploitation globally.
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De-commodification has often been linked to being a citizen in a welfare state with
both duties and rights towards the state. The first conception of de-commodification,
as discussed by Polanyi, “protected citizens from major social risks and insulated their
living standards from dependence on wage payments” and “the counter-movement that
pressed for social reforms lead to the creation of a welfare state dependent on public
services paid for by taxes and social contributions” [97] (p. 62).
The welfare state moderated and mitigated the negative social implications of capi-
talism in the western world. Polanyi’s perspective helps raise important questions about
whether we should not see environmental policies in the same way as social policies, asking
how could we de-commodify nature in general and animals and eco-systems in particular?
This would extend rights and obligations beyond those of individual citizens and
their states, to people’s collective territories, ecosystems, and interrelationships. It is
therefore of utmost importance that social policy and social citizenship are de-colonized
to include indigenous science and traditional ecological knowledge in ways that not only
recognize rights, but also custodial obligations. These systems are holistic approaches
to governance of communities and ecosystems, developed over thousands of years of
learning, with cultures and landscapes co-evolving, forming what we now see as places
with environmental ecological integrity [98].
To rethink our thinking, we could begin by recognizing that social policy and environ-
mental policy have always been intermeshed in human cultures and the shaping of their
living places. That is why we have to move away from simple ideas about political com-
munity to more complex relation concepts about political country, or territories, because
country is, and always will be, social and political with us humans as a central part of these
integrated processes.
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